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11.  Economics in the mirror of the 
financial crisis*
Rodolfo Signorino
1 INTRODUCTION
Famously, for Hegel ([1820] 2001: 20) ‘[t]he owl of Minerva takes its 
flight only when the shades of night are gathering’, that is, philosophical 
reflection on the world runs behind the unfolding of events and is possible 
only post festum. Now that the world economy seems to be on the road 
to recovery from the global crisis which started about three years ago, 
conditions are favourable to the emergence of a less involved reflection 
on its possible causes in order to draw some useful lessons for the future. 
Another interesting subject to investigate is the search for economists’ 
responsibility in the current events. Why were economists unable to 
foresee the crisis? Did mainstream economics influence regulatory and 
control policies in financial markets so as to favour (or at least, not hinder) 
the onset of the crisis? Has the crisis shown that heterodox economics, par-
ticularly that of Keynesian inspiration, is endowed with a better explana-
tory power than orthodox economics? Thorough analysis of the causes of 
the crisis and well thought- out answers to the above questions are yet to 
emerge from the ongoing debate. The actual dimensions of the phenom-
enon under study, in fact, will probably induce many non- economists 
and economists alike to a second thought on what, till a little while ago, 
appeared as established notions. The former (non- economists) may well 
wish to change their mind about the widespread belief according to which 
accepted economic theory considers the removal of any obstacles to free 
markets as the conditio sine qua non for efficient resources allocation. The 
latter (economists) should, at least, reconsider their prescriptions on the 
subject of financial regulation, prescriptions that manifestly proved unable 
to prevent or mitigate the present financial turmoil:
[T]he trust in the ability of self- regulation of the financial markets belongs to 
political ideology, not to economic doctrine. Economists have been study-
ing for thirty years the failures of financial markets, speculative bubbles, the 
information asymmetries that distort the incentives of managers and financial 
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institutions, and liquidity crises. The lessons to be drawn concern the correct 
formulation and the contents of financial regulation, not its necessity. Evidence 
of this is the fact that the crisis has overwhelmed above all the banks, the most 
controlled sector of all. (Tabellini, 2009, my translation)
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 I discuss some of 
the factors that may have played a role in causing the crisis and emphasize 
that supporters of different economic theories will assign different weights 
to each factor in their analyses. As a consequence, suggested economic 
policies are highly sensitive to the economic theory employed in evaluat-
ing the set of causes. In section 3 I seek to defend economists from the 
common charge that their inability to foresee the crisis is a clear sign of the 
lack of scientific status of their discipline. In my view, the main liability 
of mainstream economics lies elsewhere, in its excessive trust on the self- 
equilibrating mechanisms of free- market economies. Mainstream macro-
economists may have been too hasty in dismissing the financial instability 
hypothesis proposed by Keynes and developed by Minsky. Section 4 
briefly outlines Keynes and Minsky’s contribution on this subject, while 
section 5 concludes. It hardly needs to be stressed that what follows is but 
a very tentative analysis to be duly developed in future works.
2  PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSES OF THE 
PRESENT DISTRESS
The collapse of the US sub- prime mortgage loan market, starting in spring 
2007, is generally acknowledged as the immediate cause of the present 
financial and economic crash, by far the worst experienced by free- market 
economies since World War II:
There is some consensus on the proximate causes of the crisis: (i) the US finan-
cial sector misallocated resources to real estate, financed through the issuance 
of exotic new financial instruments; (ii) a significant portion of these instru-
ments found their way, directly or indirectly, into commercial and investment 
bank balance sheets; (iii) these investments were largely financed with short- 
term debt. (Diamond and Rajan 2009: 606)
While there is substantial agreement on the proximate causes, identifica-
tion of the remote causes appears more complex. Without claiming to be 
exhaustive, a possible list of the latter should include:
1. the strong laissez- faire bias generated by the so- called Great 
Moderation;
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2. growing interdependence of economies due to the liberalization in the 
international movements of financial capital;
3. the Fed easy- money policy in the early 2000s;
4. radical changes in the nature and modus operandi of the banking 
system caused by financial innovations;
5. the changes in the incentives structure of financial managers;
6. the dynamics of income distribution and household indebtedness in 
the US economy.
The Great Moderation
The period of steady growth (mild recessions and local financial crises 
aside) starting at the end of the turbulent 1970s is generally labelled as 
the Great Moderation. The drastic reduction in the macroeconomic 
instability recorded for almost three decades preceding this crisis is gener-
ally ascribed to a plurality of factors, including (i) the structural changes 
occurring in real economies that made them more resilient to shocks; (ii) a 
substantial improvement in the performance of monetary policy in many 
industrialized countries which succeeded in reducing the volatility of infla-
tion and GDP; and (iii) good luck, in the sense that, in the period under 
consideration, shocks were less frequent and wide- ranging (Bernanke, 
2004). The Great Moderation brought with it, as a kind of by- product, 
improved trust in the thaumaturgical virtues of free markets and, by the 
same token, increased distrust in regulation and control policies by public 
authorities.2 Along the way, the complacency of economists has sharply 
increased. In particular, macroeconomists have felt (and have been per-
ceived by the public) increasingly able to comprehend the intricate mecha-
nisms of free- market economies and thus formulate the appropriate policy 
recommendations when needed.
Liberalization in the International Movements of Financial Capital
The progressive abolition of barriers to the international movement of 
financial capital has allowed an extension of the potential market for – 
mainly US- made – financial products, thus stimulating financial innova-
tion. At the same time, the growing Asian countries and the oil- producing 
Arab countries, with their surplus of savings, were inclined to purchase 
new US financial products, perceived almost as risk- free as US Treasury 
Bonds but yielding a higher expected return. A period of low real interest 
rates (Bernanke, 2005) and a considerable increase in the degree of finan-
cial interdependence in the world economy has followed. This has both 
positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the possibilities of 
M2719 - KATES PRINT.indd   184 11/07/2011   07:48
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13073 - EE - KATES:M2719 - KATES PRINT
 Economics in the mirror of the financial crisis  185
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13073 - EE - KATES:M2719 - KATES PRINT
diversification and hence of risk management have become wider; on the 
other, low real interest rates favour the rise of speculative bubbles, and 
financial interdependence causes the potential for a domino effect (simul 
stabunt simul cadent):
Since the only way diversification of idiosyncratic risks can happen is by 
sharing these risks among many companies and individuals, better diversifica-
tion also creates a multitude of counter- party relationships. Such interconnec-
tions make the economic system more robust against small shocks because 
new financial products successfully diversify a wide range of idiosyncratic risks 
and reduce business failures. But they also make the economy more vulnerable 
to certain low- probability, tail events precisely because the interconnections that 
are an inevitable precipitate of the greater diversification create potential domino 
effects among financial institutions, companies and households. In this light, 
perhaps we should not find it surprising that years of economic calm can be 
followed by tumultuous times and notable volatility. (Acemoglu, 2009: 1–2, 
emphasis added)
The actual bursting of the crisis has shown that the risk distribution curve 
was indeed much more fat- tailed than the majority of financial brokers 
were then inclined to think.
The Fed Easy- money Policy in the New Millennium
The first few years of the new millennium in the USA were characterized 
by low nominal interest rates, too low for some commentators:
The classic explanation of financial crises is that they are caused by excesses – 
frequently monetary excesses – which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. 
This crisis was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led to defaults, 
the implosion of mortgages and mortgage- related securities at financial institu-
tions, and resulting financial turmoil. Monetary excesses were the main cause 
of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003–2005, well 
below known monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based 
on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked well in 
the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented 
the boom and the bust. (Taylor, 2009a)3
Moreover, low interest rates usually induce firms to raise their debt- to- 
equity ratio (so- called financial leverage). The goal to maximize the return 
on equity together with the availability of cheap money encourages banks 
and firms to take on increasing risks. Thus, short- term indebtedness rose 
in order to increase the acquisition of long- term assets, while, at the same 
time, new and effective (from the point of view of banks and firms) proce-
dures for managing such risks were developed:
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With very low interest rates, the only way of making intermediation by the 
banks profitable was to get into more debt to buy financial assets, that is, to 
increase the financial leverage. But to do this, banks had to find a way to get rid 
of the risk involved in such assets, both because in some cases the regulators did 
not allow a certain financial leverage for the riskiest activities to be exceeded 
and because banks themselves did not want to hold too risky assets. (Perotti, 
2009, my translation)
The Process of Financial Innovation
The way to dispose of such risky assets was provided by financial inno-
vations, in particular by the process of securitization and the seemingly 
endless creation of financial derivatives. Such innovations involve a struc-
tural change in the nature and modus operandi of the credit system:
Mortgage loans are no longer granted [by banks] so as to maintain a relation-
ship with the client throughout the life of the loan and hence assume the risk 
directly (in the finance jargon: originate to hold, to originate for holding until 
loan expiration). Rather, the loan is granted to be transferred as soon as pos-
sible to the widest possible set of investors (originate to distribute). This drastic 
change in bank strategy has had potentially positive effects, but it has also 
produced serious distortions. In particular, a breakdown in the relationship 
between bankers’ risk and responsibility has ensued. Therefore, the criteria for 
credit- granting and risk- evaluation, which are the fundamental elements of a 
banker’s duty, have been loosened. What is important [from the bankers’ point 
of view] is no longer to grant loans that may be refunded at their expiration, but 
to maximize the volume of loans to be granted and hence the fees to be earned. 
(Onado, 2009: 12, my translation)
In other words, the ‘prestige game’ carried out by the new finance 
consists in converting the mortgage loan, a typical illiquid asset spring-
ing from an idiosyncratic relationship between a borrower and a lender, 
into an easily negotiable and thus highly liquid asset. Until the borrowers’ 
insolvencies were circumscribed, the prestige game worked well:
Home mortgages, credit card debt, automobile loans, student loans and the like 
were all pooled, or grouped together, and assets were issued that were backed 
by the groups. These asset pools were structured in a way that both reduced the 
risk faced by the buyer of the ‘asset- backed’ securities, and allowed borrowers 
access to credit they otherwise would not have had. It sounds like everyone 
wins; a pure efficiency gain. This all looked great, until 2007 when it became 
apparent that the quality of some of the loans in the residential mortgage pools 
might not be what they should have been. (Cecchetti, 2008: 2)
Hence, banks and other actors in the credit system became guilty of 
what Keynes stigmatized as one of the most antisocial practices in the 
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financial world, the relentless search for the liquidity of one’s own invest-
ments (see infra section 4).
The transformation in the modus operandi of the credit system (from the 
‘originate- to- hold’ to the ‘originate- to- distribute’ model) brought with it a 
change in the structure of individual incentives and the rise of a considera-
ble problem of information asymmetry among the various actors involved 
in the financial transaction:
The ‘originate and distribute’ model destroys information compared to the 
‘originate and hold’ model. The information destruction occurs at the level 
of the originator of the assets that are to be securitized. Under the ‘originate 
and hold’ model the loan officer collecting the information on the creditwor-
thiness of the would- be borrower is working for the Principal in the investing 
relationship (the originating bank or non- bank lending institution). Under the 
‘originate and distribute’ model, the loan officer of the originating banks works 
for an institution (the originating bank) that is an Agent for the new Principal 
in the investing relationship (the SPV [Special Purpose Vehicle] that purchases 
the loans from the bank and issues securities against them). With asymmetric 
information and costly monitoring, the agency relationship dilutes the incentive 
for information gathering at the origination stage. Reputation considerations 
will mitigate this problem, but will not eliminate it. (Buiter, 2007: 2–3, emphasis 
added)
Changes in the Incentives Structure of Financial Managers
As Keynes once wrote, quoting the old English proverb, you can lead a 
horse to water, but you can’t make him drink. The availability of drink-
able water is just one of the circumstances required so that the horse may 
drink; the other – essential – circumstance is that the horse is thirsty. 
Paraphrasing Keynes’s dictum, it may be maintained that the Fed easy- 
money policy and the new financial products have led the horse of the 
financial brokers to water; but the latter has (abundantly) drunk because 
it had strong incentives to do so. This point has been analysed in great 
detail by Rajan (2005: 315 ff.). In short, his thesis is the following. Until 
the 1980s in the United States the coexistence of technological and legal 
elements caused the predominance in the financial sector of traditional 
operators (banks) and a strongly risk- adverse credit policy. Bank man-
agers earned a basically fixed remuneration with very few incentives to 
take risks. Conversely, the risk that a credit management perceived as 
imprudent by the public could shake the trust of depositors and provoke a 
bank- run was overrated. As almost always happens in all those sectors in 
which ‘tranquility’ is bought at the price of a drastic competition squeeze, 
choice alternatives were nearly non- existent while inefficiencies spread: 
‘[B]ankers [were] extremely conservative. This served depositors well 
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since their capital was safe, while shareholders, who enjoyed a steady rent 
because of the limited competition, were also happy. Of course, depositors 
and borrowers had little choice, so the whole system was very inefficient.’ 
(Rajan, 2005: 315)
Such a ‘petrified forest’ situation waned when new information tech-
nologies drastically reduced the costs of acquisition and elaboration of 
financial data and legislative deregulation opened up new opportunities 
for competition in the financial sector. The salient characteristics of this 
new scenario are: (i) the appearance in the financial sector of new, non- 
banking, operators; (ii) the disintermediation of the more traditional and 
standardized financial products (in the financial jargon, plain vanilla); and 
(iii) progressive specialization of banks in producing and marketing the 
more sophisticated and innovative financial products. Consequently, also 
the incentives structure of bank managers underwent a drastic change 
since the remuneration of the latter has always been more sensitive to the 
short- run performance of their portfolio choices. In particular, Rajan 
points out that the overall remuneration of a given financial manager 
increasingly depends on the differential between the rate of return of his/
her portfolio and that of competitors’ portfolios. This means that compe-
tition in the financial sector pushes financial managers (i) to take increas-
ing risks, particularly those that may be more easily hidden or underscored 
in the periodic reports they are subject to (such as the tail risks quoted by 
Acemoglou, 2009); and (ii) to conform to the investment policy chosen 
by the majority of their colleagues/competitors. Such a herd behaviour 
strategy shields financial managers from any sanction for underperform-
ance whatever the actual pay- off achieved by the ruling investment policy.4 
Such behaviour is indeed rational from an individual point of view but 
produces, at the aggregate level, some systemic results which are not neces-
sarily benign:
Taken together, these trends suggest that even though there are far more par-
ticipants today able to absorb risk, the financial risks that are being created 
by the system are indeed greater. And even though there should theoretically 
be a diversity of opinion and actions by participants, and a greater capacity 
to absorb the risk, competition and compensation may induce more correlation 
in behavior than desirable. While it is hard to be categorical about anything as 
complex as the modern financial system, it is possible these developments may 
create more financial- sector- induced procyclicality than the past. They also 
may create a greater (albeit still small) probability of a catastrophic meltdown. 
(Rajan, 2005: 318, emphasis added)
Unfortunately, recent experience shows that it is precisely the worst sce-
nario foreseen by Rajan that has actually come true.
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Dynamics of Income Distribution
Finally, according to some ‘heterodox’ commentators, a basic role in the 
present crisis has been played by the dynamics of income distribution 
in the United States (Barba and Pivetti, 2009).5 To put it in a nutshell, 
the gist of this line of reasoning is the following. Assume that, in a given 
economy, wealthy people have a decidedly smaller (marginal and average) 
propensity to consume than the poor. Therefore, in such an economy, an 
increase in the inequality of income distribution goes hand in hand with 
an increase in aggregate saving, that is, a reduction in aggregate consump-
tion expenditure. The Keynesian evil of low aggregate demand, unable to 
foster full employment, comes true, unless the other components of aggre-
gate demand (firms’ investment expenditure, government expenditure 
and a surplus in the balance of international trade) act as a substitute for 
languishing household expenditure. The US economy in recent decades 
has witnessed an apparent paradox: the coexistence of stagnant labour 
income and rising consumption expenditure (together with rising inequal-
ity in income distribution). Such a paradox was made possible, according 
to the heterodox point of view, by a deliberate policy of easy credit by 
banks and other financial institutions that allowed increasing household 
indebtedness, and by the Fed low interest rate policy that provided the 
necessary fuel for various speculative bubbles in the real estate and finan-
cial markets. Rising market prices of property and financial assets have 
boosted household financial wealth. Households have generally replaced 
wage income with debt as the main source for financing consumption 
expenditure and have used financial capital gains as collateral to back a 
growing indebtedness. In short, many US households have got used to 
considering their (mortgaged) houses as an automatic cash dispenser. Also 
the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz acknowledges that a heavy recourse to 
debt can only delay, but not resolve, the inherent contradiction between 
increasing relative impoverishment of working classes and increasing con-
sumption expenditure:
Growing inequality too has contributed to the lack of aggregate demand. 
We have redistributed income from those who would spend it to those that 
don’t. For a while, we thought we could circumvent the problem by allowing 
Americans at the bottom and middle to continue spending anyway, by borrow-
ing. But that was not sustainable. (Stiglitz, 2009: 285)
To conclude this section, it may be claimed that a host of US domestic 
factors and international factors have played a role in the present global 
financial turmoil. Careful evaluation of the right weight to assign to each 
of these factors will help devise future intervention policies. Of course, 
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the results of this evaluation will heavily depend on the kind of economic 
theory employed.6 Mainstream macroeconomists will likely side with 
Taylor (2009a and 2009b) and, accordingly, demand a tighter monetary 
policy to prevent future bubbles. New microeconomists will be likely 
to focus on the asymmetric information and moral hazard problems in 
financial markets highlighted by Buiter (2007) and Rajan (2005) and, 
accordingly, demand a drastic change in the incentives structure of finan-
cial managers. Finally, heterodox economists will probably argue that 
governments’ most urgent task is the introduction of a set of fiscal and 
social security measures to achieve considerable income redistribution to 
the benefit of middle/low classes, while a restrictive monetary policy and/
or new and more severe regulations of the financial markets may prove to 
be ill- advised decisions since such measures would depress the consump-
tion capacity of poor families, typically those more credit- constrained.7
From the economists’ perspective the basic question to be answered is: 
has the current crisis shown the urgency of a thorough review of the main 
pillars of accepted economic theory or, on the contrary, only an upgrade 
of its analysis of financial markets? What is thus at stake is the explanatory 
power of mainstream economics and its trust in the welfare- maximizing 
virtues of free- market economies as opposed to the much less confident 
outlook endorsed by heterodox economics (Laidler, 2010).
3  ECONOMISTS UNDER TRIAL: WHY DID THEY 
FAIL TO FORESEE THE CRISIS?
The main charge levelled against economists as a profession during the 
innumerable ‘trials of economists’ celebrated in the last two years is basi-
cally the following: economists failed to predict the crisis. Many critics have 
also maintained that economics is a pseudo- science, more akin to astrol-
ogy than to astronomy, that economists’ meetings are more like reunions 
of wizards than scientific assemblies, and that it would be best for econo-
mists to maintain silence, at least for a few years. (See the speech by the 
Italian Minister for Finance, Giulio Tremonti, at the People’s Friendship 
Meeting, 2009.)
A possible line of defence against such a charge could consist in singling 
out some ‘prophetic’ contributions, that is, papers written by economists 
warning about the possible outbreak of the crisis before spring 2007. In 
this regard, the names heard most frequently are those of Rajan (2005) 
and Shiller (2000 and 2003). This line of defence is taken, for example, 
by Spaventa (2009) who nonetheless acknowledges that such ‘prophets 
of doom’ were few and far between in the economics profession: ‘In 
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general, dissenters were often treated as those boring old aunts always 
having something to grumble about at family parties’ (pp. 2−3). Likewise, 
Perotti (2009) claims that ‘the vast majority of economists neither foresaw 
nor understood the financial crisis because they were totally unaware of 
some fundamental developments in the credit market’ (my translation). 
An unpublished paper by Imperia and Maffeo (2009) shows that it is very 
hard to find prophetic contributions published by the economic journals 
with the highest impact factor and thus representative of mainstream eco-
nomics, while the situation is totally different as regards non- mainstream 
journals. From this evidence, the two authors draw the conclusion that 
heterodox economics, particularly that of Keynesian inspiration, is better 
equipped than orthodoxy to understand the causes of the crisis and to 
point out possible remedies.
In my view, the above remarks show that economists need a more robust 
line of defence than the search for single prophetic contributions. It should 
be pointed out to critics that the (incontrovertible) fact that the majority 
of economists were unable to foresee the US sub- prime collapse means 
neither that economics is a pseudo- science nor that economists should 
be sentenced to silence. In this regard, the philosophy of science may 
come to the aid of economists. The problem boils down to the following 
question: Is it legitimate to adopt the capacity to foresee accurately as the 
dividing line between science and pseudo- science and to infer from only one, 
albeit macroscopic, case of failure the non- scientific nature of a discipline? 
A thorough answer to such a question would require a whole volume on 
the logic and history of science. That said, any answer (whether positive 
or negative) would be highly controversial since, as epistemologists know, 
all scientific research programmes (to use Lakatos’ terminology) grow ‘in 
a sea of anomalies, and counter- examples are merrily ignored’ (see the 
seminal work by Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Unfortunately, binding 
widely- shared criteria have not yet been devised to ascertain whether a 
given scientific research programme has entered into a (theoretically or 
empirically) regressive phase and therefore has to be abandoned. From 
this point of view, the allocation of public and private resources for 
financing one scientific research programme rather than another is partly 
a matter of chance (albeit not entirely random). In any case, the relation-
ship between theory and facts is much more complex than recent critics of 
economics seem to hold.
Yet the critics’ position (a discipline unable to predict accurately should 
not, ipso facto, be considered scientific) deserves further investigation. In 
my view, this claim is a naive version of the so- called Symmetry Thesis. 
According to the latter, a perfect logical symmetry exists between the 
operation called explanation and that called prediction within all truly 
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scientific theories: ‘explanation is simply prediction written backwards’ 
(Blaug, 1992: 5). Therefore, taking the symmetry thesis to its logical 
conclusion, it may be maintained that the inability of a given discipline 
to foresee accurately implies its inability to explain adequately, hence its 
lack of truly scientific content.8 The symmetry thesis takes its clue from the 
hypothetico- deductive model of scientific explanation, codified by Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948). The latter claim that all truly scientific explana-
tions involve an explanans constituted by two sets of elements:
a. a list of initial conditions; and
b. (at least) one universal law.
The explanation of the phenomenon explanandum comes from a correct 
application of the standard rules of deductive logic to (a) and (b): ‘The 
event under discussion is explained by subsuming it under general laws, 
i.e. by showing that it occurred in accordance with those laws by virtue 
of the realization of certain specified antecedent conditions.’ (Hempel and 
Oppenheim, 1948: 136)
Within the hypothetico- deductive model a given wrong forecast could 
derive from the fact that the explanans of the theory under examination 
contains stochastic (that is, non- deterministic) universal laws and/or that 
initial conditions have not been duly specified. Therefore, within the 
model a given wrong forecast by no means implies that the theory under 
scrutiny is irreparably flawed. Such a conclusion holds, a fortiori, for a 
social science such as economics whose universal laws are stochastic in 
nature and an exhaustive list of initial conditions is nearly impossible. 
To put it in a nutshell, economics is a discipline, not a science: economic 
theories, being always subject to a ceteris paribus clause, can offer at best 
‘weak explanations’ (Hicks, 1983: 371). Therefore, economists, when 
they participate in public debates, should make it clear that they do not 
possess any knowledge of Truth (with capital T). As is taught in any 
first- year course of statistics, stating that ‘given a significance level of 
__%, available evidence does not allow the hypothesis H0 to be rejected’ 
in no way means that the hypothesis H0 is true in the ordinary sense of 
the word.9
Intellectual modesty is a great virtue in economics also for the following 
reason. As recently emphasized by Gilles Saint- Paul (2009):
[in the economic world] beliefs about the future and about how the economy 
works affect the trajectory [of the object under study]. [. . .] The actual behavior 
of markets, unlike an immutable deterministic law of nature, depends on the 
beliefs of the markets, including their understanding of economic phenomena 
and their consequences for asset prices.
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Thus, when economists propose to the general public their models on 
how the economy works, their solutions to the economic problems of the 
day inevitably influence people’s beliefs and expectations and thus heavily 
contribute to forging the very object of their study.10 Here, in my view, 
is the main reason why economists are to blame for the present turmoil. 
Drastically simplifying the issue, it may be claimed that, in the pre- crisis 
years, the economic theory spread by the media and taught in first- year 
macroeconomics courses at the top universities was highly confident in 
the ability of free- market economies to determine an efficient allocation of 
economic resources, albeit in the long run. The macroeconomic consensus 
at the time is thus summarized by Taylor (2000: 90):
First, the long- run real GDP trend, or potential GDP, can be understood using 
the growth model that was first developed by Robert Solow and that has now 
been extended to make ‘technology’ explicitly endogenous. Second, there is 
no long- run trade- off between inflation and unemployment, so that monetary 
policy affects inflation but is otherwise neutral with respect to real variables in 
the long run. Third, there is a short- run trade- off between inflation and unem-
ployment with significant implications for economic fluctuations around the 
trend of potential GDP; the trade- off is due largely to temporarily sticky prices 
and wages.
Hence, cyclical fluctuations are traced back either to exogenous (mainly 
supply- side) shocks or to plain policy errors. From this theoretical per-
spective, active fiscal and monetary policies are considered more as part of 
the problem than as part of the solution:
Fifty- some years ago, when I began to study economics, students were taught 
that the private sector had no tendency to gravitate to full employment, that it 
was prone to undesirable fluctuations amplified by multiplier and accelerator 
effects, and that it was riddled with market failures of various sorts. But it was 
also believed that a benevolent, competent, democratic government could sta-
bilise the macroeconomy and reduce the welfare consequence of most market 
failures to relative insignificance. Fifty years later, in the beginning years of 
this century, students were taught that representative governments produce 
pointless fluctuations in prices and output but, if they can be constrained from 
doing so − by an independent central bank, for example − free markets are 
sure to produce full employment and, of course, many other blessings besides. 
(Leijonhufvud, 2009: 1)
Once it is granted that free- market economies provide an efficient 
resources allocation, a likely next step is to hold the belief that free 
markets are able to create by themselves the right ‘rules of the game’ and 
the right sanctions for misbehaviour. Supporters of this view usually claim 
that the necessity to keep and possibly increase one’s own reputational 
M2719 - KATES PRINT.indd   193 11/07/2011   07:48
194 The global financial crisis
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13073 - EE - KATES:M2719 - KATES PRINT Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13073 - EE - KATES:M2719 - KATES PRINT
capital is a sufficient deterrent against individual opportunistic behaviour. 
Accordingly, public authorities should only adopt a soft- touch regulation 
of markets.11 Thus, a first lesson that the crisis may teach mainstream 
economists is that markets (particularly, financial markets) may not be 
able to solve by themselves the distortions caused by individual oppor-
tunistic behaviour. This means that both academic economists and those 
working for public authorities should reconsider the issue of regulation 
and control of the financial markets:
Forgetting the institutional foundations of markets, we mistakenly equated 
free markets with unregulated markets. Although we understand that even 
unfettered competitive markets are based on a set of laws and institutions 
that secure property rights, ensure enforcement of contracts, and regulate firm 
behaviour and product and service quality, we increasingly abstracted from 
the role of institutions and regulations supporting market transactions in our 
conceptualisation of markets. [.  .  .] We must now start building a theory of 
market transactions that is more in tune with their institutional and regulatory 
foundations. We must also turn to the theory of regulation − of both firms and 
financial institutions − with renewed vigour and hopefully additional insights 
gained from current experience. (Acemoglu, 2009: 2)
A second lesson is that the results achieved by modern microeconomic 
theory in terms of sub- optimality of equilibria when markets are plagued 
with information asymmetries involve macroeconomic consequences that 
cannot be further neglected. As argued by Spaventa (2009: 3), contem-
porary macroeconomic models arising from the debate between the New 
Classical and New Keynesian economists are rigorously micro- founded. 
Yet their micro- foundations are hardly compatible with the rise and the 
bursting of financial crises. In particular, such models assume that (i) 
asset prices reflect the set of available information, thus ruling out the 
phenomenon of asymmetric information; and (ii) agents are always on 
their intertemporal budget constraint, thus ruling out the phenomenon of 
bankruptcy).12
4  A DIFFERENT VIEW ON FREE- MARKET 
ECONOMIES: THE FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
HYPOTHESIS
The dissatisfaction with contemporary macro- models may provide a stim-
ulus to elaborate a macroeconomic theory that (a) does not depict crises 
as exceptional or negligible events; (b) shows that crises may arise from 
purely financial motives; and (c) explains the mechanisms of the contagion 
from the financial markets to the commodity and labour markets:
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The macroeconomic models currently used fail to explain causes and conse-
quences of the accumulation of financial imbalances and ample variations in 
asset prices. It is only recently that models describing the transmission channels 
of monetary policy have started to highlight the complexity of the interme-
diation process, interactions among intermediaries, the causes and effects of 
large- scale portfolio reallocations, the possibility of speculative bubbles, and 
the feedback relationships between the financial sector and the real sector of the 
economy. Assessment of the systemic risk that derives from the increasing inter-
dependence among economies, sectors, economic agents, brought about by 
market liberalization and financial innovation, is the field in which it is urgent 
to invest. It is the challenge for the new generation of economists. (Draghi, 
2009: 6, my translation)
To be equal to the task pointed out by the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy, Mario Draghi, inspiration may be drawn from a research tradition 
that, up to the bursting of the crisis, appeared definitively buried in the 
cemetery of the history of economic thought, in the section devoted to fal-
lacious theories: Keynesian economics. In Chapter 12 of his The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936, now reproduced in vol. 
VII of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, (Johnson and 
Moggridge, 1971–89)) bearing the title ‘The state of long- term expecta-
tion’, Keynes emphasizes that financial markets, allowing the trading of 
securities representative of real capital goods, have made liquid for the 
individual investor what it is illiquid for society: investment. On the one 
hand, this favours the very same investment process: few entrepreneurs 
would bet their own money on long- term and uncertain investment 
projects if they did not have, at any moment, the opportunity to sell their 
own investment in the financial markets, that is, to turn it into liquid 
money. (As noted by Keynes, few men would get married in the absence of 
the institution of divorce!). On the other hand, such an opportunity pro-
vided by financial markets to any individual investor constitutes a strong 
element of instability for the investment process at the economy level (and, 
through the multiplier mechanism, for aggregate demand and aggregate 
income and employment) since it opens the way to short- term speculation. 
Keynes’s thought in this regard is worth a full quotation:
It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, 
possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the average private inves-
tor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It 
happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and 
speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons are, in 
fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long- term forecasts of the 
probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes 
in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public. 
They are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who 
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buys it ‘for keeps’, but with what the market will value it at, under the influ-
ence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence. [.  .  .] Of the maxims 
of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti- social than the fetish of liquidity, 
the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to 
concentrate their resources upon the holding of ‘liquid’ securities. It forgets that 
there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole. The 
social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time 
and ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most 
skilled investment to- day is ‘to beat the gun’, as the Americans so well express 
it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half- crown to the 
other fellow. (emphasis added)
In so far as speculative traders do not internalize all economic conse-
quences arising from their trading activity, short- term speculative trading 
in financial markets involves a strong negative externality. Consistent 
with this formulation, Keynes proposes the introduction of a tax on Stock 
Exchange negotiations in order to close the gap between the private mar-
ginal cost and the social marginal cost of short- term speculation:13
It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible 
and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges. That the 
sins of the London Stock Exchange are less than those of Wall Street may be 
due, not so much to differences in national character, as to the fact that to the 
average Englishman Throgmorton Street is, compared with Wall Street to the 
average American, inaccessible and very expensive. [. . .] The introduction of a 
substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most 
serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of 
speculation over enterprise in the United States.
Keynes’s lesson on the relationship between financial markets and the 
investment process in free- market economies was subsequently developed 
by Hyman P. Minsky, a long- forgotten economist today (re)discovered by 
many commentators (see Whalen, 2008 and Yellen 2009. For a thorough 
assessment of Minsky’s heritage see Bellofiore and Ferri, 2001).
Perhaps the most surprising conclusion stemming from Minsky’s contri-
bution is that economic stability is destabilizing since a prolonged period of 
stable growth without inflation induces the actors in the financial markets 
to believe that future gross incomes will continue to rise and therefore an 
increasing debt- to- equity ratio will be sustainable: ‘Stable growth is incon-
sistent with the manner in which investment is determined in an economy 
in which debt- financed ownership of capital- assets exists and in which the 
extent to which such debt- financing can be carried is determined by the 
market.’ (Minsky, 1977)
This is what Minsky calls the Financial Instability Hypothesis, that is a 
‘theory of how a capitalist economy endogenously generates a financial 
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structure which is susceptible to financial crises and how the normal func-
tioning of financial markets in the resulting boom economy will trigger a 
financial crisis.’ (ibid.) Minsky’s analysis starts from the observation that 
accumulation of capital goods in modern capitalist economies is largely 
carried out through debt financing. Debt financing involves the exchange 
of present money (which is certain) for future money (which is, obviously, 
uncertain). Thus, behind the world of real commodities (consumption and 
capital goods), there is a ‘paper world’ made of liabilities to pay money 
at dates specified or as conditions arise, irrespective of whether or not the 
future profits expected by the borrowers are realized:
The viability of this paper world rests upon the cash flows (or gross profits after 
out- of- pocket costs and taxes) that business organizations, households, and 
governmental bodies, such as states and municipalities, receive as a result of the 
income- generating process. [.  .  .] The validation of business debt requires that 
prices and outputs be such that almost all firms earn large enough surpluses over 
labor and material costs either to fulfill the gross payments required by debt or to 
induce refinancing. Refinancing takes place only if gross profits are expected to be 
large enough either to validate the new debt or to induce further refinancing (ibid.)
In this regard Minsky distinguishes between (a) hedge finance; (b) specula-
tive finance; and (c) ultra- speculative or Ponzi finance. In the first case, in 
any given period, capital gross income exceeds the flows of debt payments 
by a safe margin. In the second case, in the initial periods the flows of 
debt payments exceed capital gross income, while in the following periods 
the opposite holds. However, the present value of expected cash receipts 
is greater than the present value of payment commitments (unless inter-
est rates increase sharply and unexpectedly). Finally, in the third case, 
during the whole life of the debt, the flows of interest payments exceed 
capital gross income. Hence, units engaged in a Ponzi finance scheme are 
forced to make new debts just to be able to pay the interests on previous 
debt. As remarked by Minsky (1980), since such refinancing is available 
only if the total cash inflows expected by a Ponzi unit exceed its total cash 
outflows, the survival of a Ponzi unit often depends on the expectation 
that, at a given future time, certain assets may be sold at a sufficiently 
high price. The US sub- prime market bubble is thus a typical instance of 
a Ponzi finance. Banker a is willing to grant to the part- time worker b a 
mortgage loan even if the expected net income of b is uncertain or unable 
to match the interest payments (at least in some of the periods of the debt 
lifetime) since a expects a steady increase in the market value of the house 
purchased by b. Thus, a believes that, in the event of b’s insolvency, he/she 
could get enough from the sale of b’s house to recover the residual instal-
ments of the loan unpaid by b:
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Understanding the subprime crisis requires understanding the role played by 
the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). They increased the demand for 
the housing stock through subsidies that raised the homeownership rate to an 
unsustainable level, and, as a consequence of a relatively inelastic supply of 
housing due to land and local zoning constraints, contributed to a sustained 
rise in house prices. That rise in housing prices made the issuance of subprime 
and Alt- A loans appear relatively risk free. (Hetzel, 2009: 217, emphasis added)
Part of the decline [in underwriting standards in the prime and subprime 
mortgage] may have stemmed from the rapid price escalation in the value of 
the underlying collateral − the land and structures that secured the mortgage. 
This led many strapped borrowers and their lenders/investors to believe that 
the borrowers could refinance their way out of any payment problems. Lenders 
and investors also came to believe that ever- escalating home prices would 
eliminate any loss in the event that a risky borrower defaulted and the loan was 
foreclosed. (Utt, 2008)
Obviously, as long as the house market price keeps rising, _’s expecta-
tions are ex post confirmed. Increasing numbers of people are induced to 
invest their (own or borrowed) money in the real estate market so that the 
property demand curve becomes positively sloped (higher prices lead to 
higher demand) and a speculative bubble starts.14
As recalled above, for Minsky a typical feature of free- market econo-
mies experiencing a period of prolonged prosperity is the spread of 
expectations of further rises of Stock Exchange and further increases 
in corporate profits and dividends. Accordingly, people and firms are 
increasingly prepared to pass from hedge to speculative financing and 
from speculative to Ponzi financing. As a consequence, the economy’s 
overall degree of financial fragility increases: ‘Over a period of good years 
the weight of units with speculative and Ponzi positions increases, and the 
economy becomes more fragile: a minor shock may initiate a major debt 
deflation which, if not opposed by active economic policy, may lead to a 
deep and long depression.’ (Bellofiore and Ferri, 2001: 15)
Thus, from Minsky’s perspective, it comes as no surprise that a minor 
shock such as the collapse of the US sub- prime mortgage loan market led 
the world economy into a long deep depression.
What, for Minsky, makes a substantial difference between the highly 
unstable pre- 1929 economies and modern less- unstable economies are: 
(i) the dimension of government deficits; and (ii) the rapidity and extent 
of Central Bank interventions in the financial markets (see in particular 
Minsky, 1980). As regards point (i) modern large public deficits sustain 
aggregate demand (Keynes) and corporate aggregate profits (Kalecki) 
when private (consumption and investment) expenditure declines. As 
regards point (ii), mindful of the 1929 bank run and the consequent credit 
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squeeze, debt- deflation spiral and mass unemployment, central banks 
take seriously their role as lenders- of- last- resort. Yet Minsky is aware that 
there are two sides to the coin: while modern fiscal and monetary inter-
ventionist policies make post- 1929 free- market economies less prone to 
violent financial cycles, they bring about inflationary bias and a reduction 
in the economy’s potential growth rate.
5 FINAL REMARKS
In this chapter I discussed some of the factors that may have played a role 
in causing the present financial turmoil. In particular, I focused on three 
different theoretical explanations: (i) errors in monetary policy manage-
ment; (ii) asymmetric information and distortion of incentive structures 
in financial markets; and (iii) growing inequality in income distribution 
coupled with increasing working class indebtedness. Obviously, the expla-
nation eventually gaining most consensus will set the policy agenda for 
the years to come. I also sought to defend economics from the recurrent 
charge of not being a truly scientific discipline since, according to critics, 
its practitioners were unable to foresee the crisis. I argued that econo-
mists’ responsibility for the present financial dislocation lies elsewhere, 
in their over- optimistic attitude towards the way free- market economies 
actually work. Finally, as an alternative to mainstream economics I 
briefly sketched Keynes’s and Minsky’s contributions on the relationship 
between investment and finance. In particular, the latter depicts capitalism 
as a fragile system, prone to continuous wide- ranging booms and reces-
sions, unless carefully regulated by public authorities and other economic 
institutions. Therefore, from a Keynesian perspective the crisis should 
remind economists that one of their most demanding tasks is to design 
the appropriate set of policies and institutions required to promote public 
prosperity and happiness in the ever- evolving environment generated by 
free- market economies.
NOTES
 * An extended version of this chapter in Italian was presented to a Ph.D. seminar, ‘Gli 
economisti allo specchio della crisi’, organized by the Dottorato in Diritto Comunitario 
e Diritto Interno [PhD programme in European Community Law and Italian National 
Law], Law Faculty, University of Palermo, 11 February 2010. I wish to thank Laura 
Lorello for her kind invitation to the seminar, and Michele Battisti, Carlo Panico and 
Andrea Salanti for their comments on a previous version of this chapter. Usual caveats 
apply.
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 1. The global movement towards a softer regulation of financial markets also comes 
from the competition among countries in the attempt to attract the international flows 
of financial capital: ‘While regulation is national, finance is global. The location of 
financial enterprises and markets is endogenous; many are very footloose. A thriving 
financial sector creates jobs and wealth, and is generally environmentally friendly. So 
regulators try to retain and attract financial businesses to their jurisdictions in part by 
offering more liberal, less onerous regulations. This competition through regulatory 
standards has led to less stringent regulation almost everywhere.’ (Buiter, 2007: 6). 
Moreover, a role not yet sufficiently analysed in the implementation of ‘easy- going’ 
financial legislation has been played by the lobbying performed by private financial 
institutions (Igan et al., 2010).
 2. Taylor has recently written a book (Taylor, 2009b) reproaching the Fed for deviating 
from the so- called Taylor rule in the years before the crisis. The Taylor rule (Taylor, 
1993) prescribes how a Central Bank should adjust its interest rate instrument accord-
ing to the differential between actual and planned inflation and between actual and 
potential output. For a critical assessment of the interpretations of the crisis based on 
the Taylor rule see Brancaccio and Fontana (2009).
 3. The idea that brokers tend to mimic the behaviour of their colleagues/competitors is 
not new. In his 1937 essay ‘The general theory of employment’ (Quarterly Journal of 
Economics), in which he summarized the main tenets of his new revolutionary economic 
theory, Keynes wrote: ‘Knowing that our individual judgment is worthless, we endeav-
our to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. 
That is, we endeavour to conform with the behaviour of the majority or the average. The 
psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy the others 
lead to what we may strictly term a conventional judgment.’ (Keynes’s emphasis. This 
essay is now reproduced in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. XIV, 
pp. 109–23). Recently, herd behaviour was analysed by Banerjee (1992).
 4. In the past two decades, a rising debt- to- income ratio and the consequent rise in house-
holds’ financial fragility has become a common feature of many industrialized countries 
besides the USA: see Rinaldi and Sanchis- Arellano (2006).
 5. Sir John Hicks once claimed that economic theories are ‘rays of light, which illuminate 
a part of the target, leaving the rest in the dark. As we use them, we avert our eyes from 
things that may be relevant, in order that we should see more clearly what we do see. It 
is entirely proper that we should do this, since otherwise we should see very little. But 
it is obvious that a theory which is to perform this function satisfactorily must be well 
chosen; otherwise it will illumine the wrong things’ (Hicks, 1976: 208)
 6. Though not declared heterodox economists, Fitoussi and Stiglitz (2009: 5) put at the 
top of their list of recommendations a series of fiscal and social security measures to 
reverse the present trend of income distribution in order to stimulate aggregate demand 
in the medium to long run.
 7. The symmetry thesis has been submitted to harsh criticisms. In fact, contra it is possible 
to mention two of the best- known scientific theories, that is, Newton’s theory of univer-
sal gravitation (a theory that predicts but does not explain) and Darwin’s theory of the 
evolution of living species (a theory that explains but does not predict): see Blaug (1992: 
5 ff).
 8. In the statistics jargon _ % is the probability of committing a Type I error, that is, the 
rejection of an H0 hypothesis which is actually true; while __% is the probability of com-
mitting a Type II error, that is, the failure to reject an H0 hypothesis which is actually 
false. Making an analogy with the logic of criminal trial, it may be said that a Type I 
error is the conviction of an innocent, while a Type II error is the acquittal of a culprit. 
Given the amount of available evidence both in statistics and criminal law, an inevitable 
trade- off exists between these two kinds of errors.
 9. This is particularly evident within the rational expectations approach in economics: 
‘expectations since they are informed predictions of future events are essentially the 
same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory’ (Muth, 1961: 316).
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10. For example White (2009: 39) explicitly supports the superiority of market discipline 
thesis over public supervision in the banking system.
11. Goodfriend (2002) provides an easily- accessible introduction to contemporary 
macro- models.
12. The proposed tax on financial transactions to mitigate short- term speculative fluctua-
tions today takes the well- known name of the Tobin tax, from the US Nobel laureate, 
James Tobin, who proposed it in the early 1970s.
13. To have a complete description of what has happened in the last few years it is neces-
sary to add to Minsky’s analysis an element that, in his time, was still in its embryonic 
state: the securitization process, that is, the possibility of converting the idiosyncratic 
loan relationship between _ and _ into a negotiable instrument traded within an ample 
set of financial operators. Thanks to these operations of derived finance, lender _ frees 
him/herself from the insolvency risk of borrower _ and gets fresh liquidity to use in new 
financial operations.
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